Syntax-based Default Reasoning as Probabilistic Model-based Diagnosis by Lang, Jerome
391 
Syntax-based default reasoning as probabilistic model-based 
diagnosis 
Jerome Lang 
IRIT 
Universite Paul Sabatier 
31062 Toulouse Cedex 
France 
email: lang@irit.fr 
Abstract 
We view the syntax-based approaches to de­
fault reasoning as a model-based diagnosis 
problem, where each source giving a piece of 
information is considered as a component. It 
is formalized in the ATMS framework (each 
source corresponds to an assumption). We 
assume then that all sources are indepen­
dent and "fail" with a very small probability. 
This leads to a probability assignment on the 
set of candidates, or equivalently on the set 
of consistent environments. This probability 
assignment induces a Dempster-Shafer belief 
function which measures the probability that 
a proposition can be deduced from the evi­
dence. This belief function can be used in 
several different ways to define a nonmono­
tonic consequence relation. We study ans 
compare these consequence relations. The 
case of prioritized knowledge bases is briefly 
considered. 
1 Introduction 
Syntax-based approaches to inconsistency handling, 
default reasoning and belief revision have been pro­
posed and studied in various forms (e.g. [14], [16], 
[31], [15], [4], [6], [24], and especially [25] and [1]). 
They assume that the input (the knowledge base -
KB for short) consists of a set of logical sentences, 
possibly equipped with a priority ordering; when this 
knowledge base is inconsistent, these approaches select 
among the consistent sub-bases of the KB some pre­
ferred sub-bases (the selection criterion can be for in­
stance maximality w.r.t. set inclusion1 or cardinality). 
A consequence relation is then generally defined by 
taking the intersection of the logical closures of these 
preferred sub-bases. Each formula of the KB is con­
sidered as a distinct piece of information, which can 
1 In this case the preferred sub-bases coincide with the 
extensions of default logic [36] restricted to normal defaults 
without prerequisites. 
be kept in the knowledge base or rejected from it in­
dependently from the others; therefore, it may happen 
that two semantically equivalent knowledge bases may 
be revised differently and thus lead to different conclu­
sions - this is why they are called syntax-based. Con­
sider for instance K1 = {p, •p, q} and K2 = {pl\q, •p}; 
q holds in all maximal consistent sub-bases of Kt but 
this is not the case for K2. When cardinality is used 
to select preferred subbases, even the number of oc­
currences of identical (or logically equivalent) formu­
las in K matters: for instance, {p, -,p} has two consis­
tent sub-bases of maximum cardinality ( {p} and { -,p}) 
where as {p, •p, -,p} has only one ( { -,p, •p}). 
Now, in model-based diagnosis, the consistency-based 
approaches (see [37], [13], [35]) proceed in a very sim­
ilar manner, since they look for preferred candidates, 
i.e. minimal (w.r.t. a given selection criterion) sets of 
faulty components, such that the description of how 
the non-faulty components work is consistent with the 
observations2. The link between default reasoning and 
model-based diagnosis has already been well studied 
(e.g. [33], [37], [26], [20]): indeed, the principles be­
hind consistency-based diagnosis and syntax-based ap­
proaches are basically the same: there is a correspon­
dance between a source providing us with a piece of 
information and a component of a diagnosis problem; 
a faulty component corresponds to an erratic source 
which gives a piece of information which is not rele­
vant (by analogy, we will say that the source is faulty). 
When the component is working correctly, the formula 
describing its normal behaviour must be satisfied, and 
analogously, when the source is not faulty, the formula 
associated to it must be true in the real world. Then, a 
candidate in a diagnosis problem (i.e. a set of compo­
nents consistent with the observations) corresponds to 
a candidate in a syntax-based default reasoning prob­
lem (i.e. a set of formulas whose deletion restores the 
consistency of the knowledge base). 
In the well-known diagnosis system GDE, De Kleer 
and Williams [11] propose a probabilistic criterion to 
2The principle of minimizing the set of faulty compo­
nents w.r.t. a given criterion is generally called principle 
of parsimony (see e.g. [29]). 
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rank candidates: each component has an initial prob­
ability of fault, and it is assumed that components fail 
independently; then, the a posteriori probability that 
a given candidate is the real candidate is computed 
via Bayes' rule, conditioning by the observations. This 
principle of ranking candidates w .r. t. their probability 
assumes the initial probabilities of fault are available. 
When it is not the case, De Kleer [12] proposes to as­
sume that all components have a very small probability 
of fault. What we propose to do here is to use a similar 
assumption for syntax-based default reasoning, which 
induces probabilities of the consistent sub-bases of the 
KB (which comes down to compute the probabilities 
of the candidates - a candidate specifies which pieces 
of information have to be rejected and thus which ones 
remain in the KB). We will check that, as expected, 
the consistent sub-bases of maximal cardinality are the 
most probable ones. This probability distribution in­
duces then a Dempster-Shafer belief function, which 
evaluates the probability that a formula can be proved 
from the available evidence (which consists only in the 
KB and the assumptions of independence and small 
probabilities of fault). The most original contribution 
of this paper is to propose (and to compare) many 
different ways to define a syntax-based consequence 
relation from this induced belief function. An inter­
esting point is that we will then recover some already 
known syntax-based consequence relations (but with a 
new justification) and obtain a few new ones. Lastly, 
we propose briefly a generalization to the case of pri­
oritized knowledge bases. 
2 Inconsistent knowledge bases as 
systems to diagnose 
From now on, £ denotes a propositional language gen­
erated by a finite number of propositional variables. 
Formulas will be denoted by greek letters rp, ¢, etc. 
T denotes tautology, F= classical entailment and Cn 
logical closure. 
A knowledge base (KB) intuitively consists of a set :F of 
hard facts which cannot be rejected, and a multiset � 
of default formulas which can be rejected if necessary3. 
To distinguish each default from the others, we create 
a set of assumptions A = {A1, ... ,An} (with as many 
assumptions as defaults) and label each default with 
a distinct assumption. We define a knowledge base as 
in [31] and we then recall well-known definitions of the 
ATMS and model-based diagnosis literatures [10], [37], 
[11], [13]. 
Definition 1 A knowledge base K is defined as a 
couple K = (:F, Ll) where 
3We recall that in a multiset several occurrences of the 
same element are distinguished: this obviously has to be 
the case for syntax-based approaches where several occur­
rences of the same default constitute several distinct pieces 
of information. 
• :F is a finite set of formulas (hard facts) 
• Ll = {'Pl. .. . , 'Pn} a finite multiset of formulas (de­
faults). 
The assumption set A (K) associated to K (denoted 
by A when no confusion is possible) is defined by A 
= { A1, ... , An} where each assumption is associated to 
a default by the mapping 6: Vi= l...n, 8(Ai) ='Pi· 
Definition 2 A subset of A is called an environ­
ment. The context of an environment E is defined 
by Context( E) = Cn(:F U{ rp; lA; E E} )5. An envi­
ronment E is consistent iff Context(E) is consis­
tent. It is irredundant iff no proper superset of E is 
consistent6 • It is consistent with maximal cardinality 
(or, for short, maxcard consistent) iff for any con­
sistent E' we have lEI 2: IE' I· 
A nogood is an inconsistent environment. A candi­
date C is the complementary of a consistent environ­
ment. It is minimal iff no proper subset of C is a 
candidate; it is a candidate of minimal cardinality (or 
mincard for short) iff for any candidate C' we have 
ICI � IC'I7· 
Pursuing the analogy with model-based diagnosis, the 
source of information corresponding to the assumption 
A; can be viewed as a component; rp; is then the log­
ical description of how the component works. If A; is 
true then the source is "non-faulty" and the associated 
formula 'Pi is satisfied in the real world; if A; is false 
then the source is "faulty" and then we don't know 
whether the associated formula is satisfied or not in 
the real world {in terms of diagnosis, it corresponds 
to the assumption that we don't know how behaves a 
faulty component). 
As in [13] a nogood {Ait> .. . , Ai,} will also be writ-
ten logically by -.A; 1 V ... V ..,A; P 8 ; a candidate {Ah, ... , AJ.} will also be written logically by -,Ail ('­... I\ -.AJ.· The nogood base, denoted by -.N, ts 
the conjunction of all irredundant nogoods; it is well­
known to be equivalent to the conjunction of all mini­
mal nogoods, and as well to the disjunction of all [irre­
dundant] candidates [13]. A detailed example is given 
in Section 3 and continued in Section 4. 
4Instead of this we could have equivalently generated 
the set of ATMS justifications A; ---+ <p; 
5Note that Context(A) = K. 
6This is called an interpretation in [10] 
7 Obviously, a minimal (resp. mincard) candidate is the 
complementary of an irredundant (resp. maxcard) consis­
tent environment. 
8Note that -.A;, corresponds to De Kleer et al.'s [13] 
notation AB( c;i) meaning that the component c;1 is faulty. 
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3 From syntactical knowledge bases to 
belief functions 
3.1 Computing the probability of 
environments 
As in [12} we make the two following basic assump­
tions: 
• (I) each assumption is independent from the oth­
ers. This means that each default piece of infor­
mation is kept or rejected independently from the 
others - which is in accordance with the spirit of 
syntax-based approaches to default reasoning. 
• (S) all assumptions are assigned the same initial 
probability (the sources have the same prior prob­
ability of fault), and this probability of fault is 
very small: Vi, Prob(-.A;) = t:, with£« 1. 
This leads to define a probability assignment on the en­
vironment set 2A. Thus, the prior probability of an en­
vironment E of cardinality k is Pr(E) = t:Tl-k(l- c)k 
(which is approximated by c:Tl-k when c:-+ 0). Pr(E) 
is the prior probability that E is the real environment, 
i.e. the environment corresponding to the real world. 
Now, this real environment must be consistent; to en­
sure that inconsistent environments are given a zero 
probability, the prior probability is conditioned on the 
consistent environments (see e.g. [22)), i.e. 
Proposition 1 Assume that there are exactly p max­
card consistent environments; let k be their cardinality. 
Let E be any consistent environment. Then9 
• if /E/ = k then Pr(E/-,N) = l + O(t:) p 
• if /E� < k then Pr(EI-.N) = O(t:k-IEI) 
Proof: let us prove first prove that Pr( -.N) 
pen-k + O(t:Tl-k+1). Let C1, ... ,Cp be the mincard 
candidates; they are the complementary of the max­
card consistent environments, so their cardinality is 
n - k. Let Cp+l, . .. , Cq be the other irredundant can­
didates. Pr(-.N) = Pr(C1 v . . . v Cq) == Pr(Ct) + 
... + Pr(Cp) +Pr(Cp+t) + .. . + Pr(Cq)- Li#i Pr(C; 1\ 
Ci )+ "E.,;'Ii,UI,ifl Pr(C;I\Ci 1\Cf)+ .... Now, Pr(C1) = 
... = Pr(Cp) = cn-k; Vi= p + l...q, Pr(C;) = t:Tl-k+l; 
and Vi, j such that i :j:. j, C; 1\ C; contains at most 
n - k + 1 literals ..,A;'s (if it contained only n - k, 
since n - k is the maximum cardinality of a con­
sistent environment, one of the two candidates C; 
and Cj would be contained in the other one, which 
would contradict the fact they are irredundant); thus, 
Pr( C; 1\ C;) � e-" -k+l. A fortiori, for all conjunctions 
9We recall that the notation O(gk) denotes any function 
f of g such that .IJ�l -+c-o 0. 
of more than two C;'s: Pr(C;1 1\ ... I\ C;,.) � t:n-k+l. 
Thus, Pr(-.N) = pt:n-k + O(e-n-Hl). Now, E f= -.N ( 
I ) 
� ,n-IEI(t-€1EI) 
h 
�' 
so Pr E -.N = Pr(-,N} = P•"-li+0(€"-1<+1) ; t ere1ore 
if /EI = k, Pr(EI-.N) = � + O(t:); and if lEI < k, 
Pr(EI•N) = O(e-J:-1£1). 
Computing the probability of the consistent environ­
ments is exactly the same task as computing the proba­
bilities of candidates in consistency-based model-based 
diagnosis ([11], [12], [35]). Proposition 1 tells that the 
only consistent environments whose probability does 
not tend to 0 when t: -+ 0 are those of maximal car­
dinality. This is in accordance with a version of the 
principle of parsimony consisting in considering only 
the candidates of minimum cardinality ( [12} , [29]). 
It is also interesting to compute the probability of fault 
of a single source, namely Pr( -.Ad-.N): 
Proposition 2 As before, assume that there are e:r­
actly p maxcard consistent environments and let k be 
their cardinality. Let A; be an assumption. 
• if A; is absent of r � 1 maxcard consistent envi­
ronments, then 
• if A; appears in all maxcard consistent environ­
ments, and is absent of r' irredundant consistent 
environments of cardinality k- 1, then 
The proof uses the same kind of considerations as the 
proof of Proposition 1. 
Remark: if A; appears in all irredundant consistent 
environments, then r' = 0 and Proposition 1 gives 
Pr( -,A;/•N) = €. Indeed, in this case, -.A; never 
appears in -.N and therefore -.A; and •N are inde­
pendent; thus Pr(-.A;/-,N) = Pr(•A;)::::: €. 
Example: F :::: {a} and to contains the following for­
mulas (with their respective Ai 's): 
A1 a -+ b 1\ e 1\ f 
A2 a-> c 1\ d 
Aa ..,b v -.d 
A.1 e 
As -.b 1\ ..,c 1\ -.e 1\ g 
As b 1\ -.c 1\ d 1\ --..e 1\ -,g 
Here are the irredundant consistent environments, 
their probability and their context10: 
10We omit the Cn notation in the context culumn, so 
for instance it should be read Context({A1,A2,A�}) = 
Cn( {a, b, c, d, e, f}) etc. 
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E ) Pr(E)-.N) l Context(E) 
{At,Aa,A4} � + O(e:) a, b, •d, e, f 
{A2,Aa,A4} � + O(e:) a, --,b, c, d, e 
1A3,Asl O(e:) a, •b, --,c, •e, g 
{As} O(e::t) a, b, •c, d, -.e, -.g 
Here are the Pr( -.A;I•N): 
Pr(-.A1)-.N) = Pr(-.A2) = Pr(-.Aa) = � + O(e:); 
Pr(-.A4)-.N) = (1 + k)e: + O(e:2) = �c + 0(.:2); 
Pr(•A5)-.N) = Pr(•A6)-.N) = 1 +O(c); 
The maxcard consistent environments are 
{At,A2,A4}, {At,A3,A4} and {A2,A3,A4}. 
3.2 How probabilities of candidates induce a 
belief function 
We have seen that the knowledge base K induces 
a probability assignment of the environment see 2.A. 
This probability assignment of the assumption set in­
duces a Dempster-Sha.fer belieffunction (see f22}, [34], 
[27], [9], [38] for a study of this connection between 
ATMS and belief functions). As studied in detail by 
Smets [38], this belief function represents a probability 
of deductibility, i.e. the probability that the evidence is 
sufficient to prove the proposition (see also [22], (27]). 
This belief function is given by11 
Pr(E I ·N) 
EE2"\"P/IE Context(E) 
Proposition 3 Belx ( t/J) = 1 iff :F I= t/J 
Proof if :F I= 1j; for any environment E, ¢ E 
Context(E) and therefore Belx(¢) = 1. Reciprocally, 
if Belx(¢) = 1 then consider the environment 0; it 
has a non-zero probability and its context is only :F, 
therefore :F F= t/J. 
Proposition 4 Let k..p be the maximum cardinality of 
a consistent environment E such that t/J E Context(E) 
(if any) and let U!fi be the number of such environ­
ments; as before, let k be the cardinality of a maxcard 
consistent environment. Then 
• if k!/1 = k then 
u..p 
Be/K(¢) = - + O(e:) 
p 
• if k!/1 < k then 
Belx(¢) = O(e:k-k") 
11 An equivalent expression of Belg(I/J) is (see for in­
stance [22]) 
B I . ( ·1 · ) = Pr( label( 1/J) A -.N) e 1' "' Pr( -.N) 
where label( 1/J) is the logical expression of the set of all ir­
redundant consistent environments in which 1/J is provable. 
• if there is no consistent environment E such that 
1j; E Conte:ct(E) then 
Belx (t/J) = 0 
The proof comes immediately from Proposition 1. 
Example (continued): 
Belx(b V c) = 1; 
Belx(b) = � + O(s); 
Belx(g) = O(s); 
Belx(•g) = O(e:2); 
Belx(-.f) = 0. 
4 Inducing consequence relations 
We have seen that, given a knowledge base K, and 
assuming small fault probabilities and independence 
of the sources, we obtain a belief function Belx on £ 
induced by K; Be/K ( ¢) is the probability that ¢ be 
deductible from K from the evidence. Now, we can use 
this generated belief function to define nonmonotonic 
consequence relations (CR) on £. We are going to 
investigate several proposals of CRs, many of which 
will appear to be well-known. We define the CRs in the 
syntax as Pink as and Loui [30], namely K f'--¢ means 
that the formula¢ is inferred from the knowledge base 
K12. 
As in [31] we define a scenario of K = (:F, �) as a 
consistent subset S of :F U� containing :F (note that 
Cn(S) is the context of a consistent environment). A 
scenario is said irredundant (resp. maxcard) iff it is 
maximal w.r.t. set inclusion (resp. cardinality). 
Definition 3 K h ¢ iff Belx(¢) -+ ...... o 1 
Proposition 5 K f'--t 1j; iff for any maxcard scenario 
S of K, S f= t/J. 
The proof comes easily from the fact that only max­
card consistent environments have a probability which 
does not tend to 0. This kind of CR is known as a 
strong CR. More precisely, f---1 has been studied in a 
more general setting (and with priorities) in (23] and 
[1]13. This result gives thus a new interpretation of 
this well-known inference relation. 
12Note that, in spite of the syntax K f"-- 1/J, f"-- is actu­
ally a unary CRs; a binary CR induced by K would be f"--K 
where rp f"--K 1/J means that with respect to the background 
knowledge represented by K, if we assume rp then we infer 
nonmonotonically 1/J (and the unary case is recovered when 
rp = T). For the sake of simplicity, in this paper we define 
only the unary restrictions of the CRs; however this restric­
tion is not essential: indeed, syntax-based CRs generally 
satisfy tp f"--K 1/J iff f---Add(K,\0') 1/J, where Add(K,rp) 
= 
(.F 
U{<p}, t:.) (see [1]). 
13 As shown in [23] and (1], the binary and prioritized 
version a£ f"--1 is a rational inference relation which is fur­
thermore well adapted to the handling of default rules. 
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Definition 4 K r-2 1/J iff 30! > 0 such that 
BelK(l/J) -+-, ..... o a 
Proposition 6 K r-2 1/J iff there is a maxcard sce­
nario S such that S f= 1/;. 
Again, the proof comes from the fact that the consis­
tent environments with a non infinitely small belief are 
the maxcard ones. This CR is the weak (existential) 
counterpart of f---1. 
Definition 5 K f-.-a 1/J iff3a > 0 s.t. BelK(l/J) -+, ..... o 
a and BelK ( -.1/J) -+c-o 0. 
Proposition 7 K f---3 1/J iff K f-.-2 1/; and K J'v2 -.'1/J. 
The proof comes straightforwardly from Propositions 
5 and 6. This kind of CR, called argumentative in [2), 
is intermediate between weak and strong CRs. 
Definition 6 K f-.-4 1/J iff BelK ( 1/J) > 0 
Proposition 8 K f-.-4 1/J iff there is a scenario S of 
K such that S f= 1/J, or equivalently, iff there JS an 
irredundant scenario S of K such that S f= '1/J. 
The proof comes from the fact that all consistent en­
vironments have a non-zero probability. This well­
known weak CR corresponds to the provability in at 
least one extension of a normal default theory without 
prerequisites14. 
Definition 7 K f---5 1/J iff B elK ( '1/J) > 0 and 
BelK(•I/!) = 0 
Proposition 9 K r-5 '1/J iff there is a scenario of K 
entailing '1/J and if there is no scenario of K entailing 
-,-rjJ. 
This result is a corollary of Proposition 8. This CR is 
another argumentative CR. 
Definition 8 K f-.-s 1/! iff BelK ( 1/!) > � 
Proposition 10 K f---6 -rjJ iff '1/J is provable in the ma­
jority (more than one half) of the maxcard scenarios 
of K. 
The proof comes directly from the fact that all max­
card consistent environments have all the same proba­
bility (namely l) and that the non-maxcard ones have 
p 
an infinitely small probability. This kind of CR has 
been called majority CR in [30]. 
Definition 9 K f---7 -rjJ iff BelK('IfJ) > BelK(•'I/J) 
1•The corresponding strong CR (provability in all exten­
sions) , which is more interesting and which has received 
many improvements in the literature, seems to have no 
nice characterization in our framework. 
A sufficient condition for K f---6 ¢ to hold is when 
the number of max card scenarios entailing 1/; is greater 
than the number of maxcard scenarios entailing -,'1/J. 
However this condition is not necessary; the exact 
characterization is more complex: 
Proposition 11 Let u(k, '1/J) be the number of sce­
narios of K of cardinality k entailing ¢. Let 
diff('I/J, -.¢) = Max{k, u(k, 1/!) =/: u(k, •1/J)}. Then 
K f-.-7 '1/J iff u(diff(l/J, -.1/J), 1/!) > u(diff('I/J, -.'1/J), -.'1/J). 
Here is a sketch of the proof: there are 3 situations 
where BelK(l/JL > Be/K(-.7/J): 
- BelK(rP) = y and BelK(•I/!) = 7 where u.p > 
u-..p > 0; in this case, let k* be the cardinality of the 
maxcard consistent environments, then u(k*, 1/J) = u.p, 
u(k*, -,¢) = u-..p and diff('I/J, -.-rjJ) = k*; 
� BelK(I/!) = O(ek1) and BelK(-,-rjJ) = O(ek�) with 
k2 > k1 � 0, or BelK(-.1/J) = 0; in this case, u(k•­
k1,'1/J) > 0, u(k*- k1,•'1/J) = 0 and diff('I/J,-.'1/J) = 
k*- kt; 
- BelK(rP) = O(c:k1) and BelK(-.7/J) = O(c:k1) as well; 
in this case, we have to develop further the expres­
sion of Pr(EI-.N) in Proposition 1, which would show 
that if among the consistent environments of cardinal­
ity k.p(= k...,.p), there are more entailing 1/; than en­
tailing -.1/J, but if there are exactly as many, then it 
depends on the number of consistent environments of 
cardinality k.p - 1, and so on. 
It is dear from this proof that this CR has a lexi­
cographic spirit: indeed, Proposition 11 could have 
stated equivalently by : 
Proposition 12 Let L('I/J) = (u(k , '1/J), k = n ... l) and 
L(-.¢) = (u(k,-.1/;),k = n ... l) then K f-.-7 '1/J iff 
L(¢) >lex L(-.1/J), where >lex is the lexicographic or­
dering. 
Definition 10 K 
BeiK .,.p O BeiK 1/J) _,.<-+0 · 
f-.-s ¢ iff BelK(l/J) > 0 and 
Proposition 13 K f-.-a ¢ iff k.p > k-..p, where k.p is 
been defined like in Proposition 4, with the convention 
kl/i = -oo iff¢ appears in the context of no consistent 
environment. 
The proof comes easily from Proposition 4. 
Definition 11 K r-9 w iff BelK('l/J) = 1. 
Proposition 14 K f---9 '1/J iff :F f= 1/;. 
This is a clone of Proposition 3 and has thus already 
been proved. This CR is very strong and it is even 
monotonic since it accepts only the consequences of 
hard facts. 
Proposition 15 Let --< be the relation between CR 's 
(as in {30}) defined by h--< h iffVK., ¢, K h -rjJ => 
K 1----J 7/J. This relation between our f-.-; 's is depicted 
by the graph on Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: the -< relation between l---i's 
The proof would be long and tedious but does not 
present any particular difficulty. Note that the exam­
ple at the end of the Section gives counterexamples 
corresponding to almost all couples of CR.s such that 
hi h· Pinkas and Loui [30) define a safe CR as a 
CR !--- such that '</ K, '</1/J, K J'v 1/J or K J'v -.tjJ. It 
can be checked easily that !---2 and l---4 are generally 
unsafe while the other ones are safe. 
Proposition 16 When K is consistent ,  all f--; 's ex­
cept f--.-9 collapse to classical entailment, i.e. K r-; tjJ 
iff :F UA f= t/J. 
Proof" when K is consistent, there is only one maxcard 
scenario: K itself. Therefore K !---1 if; iff K f= 1/;, and 
a fortiori, all h below in the graph collapse to f=. It 
remains to show it for f--.-5, which is straightforward. 
This list of CR's is of course not exhaustive and 
one could think of giving other definitions, possibly 
parametrized by a given a > 0. The interest of such 
a list of CR's is to enable the user to use the most 
adapted CR to her specific problem, knowing that 
whichever CR she chooses, it will have an interpre­
tation in terms of the belief function induced by the 
KB and assumptions (I) and (S). While very cautious 
CR.s such as r-1 and very adventurous ones such as r-4 
or r-s are often considered as too extreme in practice, 
the more quantitative CR.s r-s, !---1 (and r-s which is 
maybe a bit less quantitative) seem to be good com­
primises inbetween, and furthermore their DS inter­
pretation is appealing. 
Example (continued): 
Let � = ( b V c V -.e) 1\ g. In the following table, the sign 
x (resp. the sign - ) means that the formula is (resp. 
is not) entailed w.r.t. h· There is no column for r-9 
(obviously, only a is a r-9-consequence of K). 
llh hlhhhFrlh h 
a X X X X X X X 
bvc X X X X X X -
c - X X X X X -
b - X - X - X -
f - - X X X X X -,d - - - X - - -
g - - - X X -
{ - - - - X X X 
..,g - - - - - - -
...,f - - - - - - -
5 Extension to the prioritized case 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X -
Many syntax-based approaches to default reasoning 
assume that the knowledge base is partitioned into 
priority levels, namely K = (Kt, ... , Kn) (1 being by 
convention the most prioritary level); these levels are 
qualitative and generally it is more acceptable to vi­
olate any number of formulas of a lower priority level 
then violate one formula of a higher priority level. 
A generalization of the maximum cardinality princi­
ple to the prioritized case is defined both in [1] and 
in [23]: a sub-base A of a prioritized knowledge base 
(K1, ... , Kn) is lexicographically strictly preferred to a 
sub-base B iff there exists a i E l..n such that '</j > i, 
lA n Sj I = IB n Sj I and lA n Sd > IB n si I; the 
same selection criterium has been used in diagnosis 
by DeKleer [1 '2]. Now, it is possible to character­
ize lexicographically preferred subtheories in terms of 
probabilities of fault; following De Kleer [12], for any 
piece of information in Ki we assign an initial proba­
bility of fault of t:; to its source, with the constraint 
that '</i and '</j > i, €J � €i (more precisely, that 
€j < c{ma:r, where fmax is an upper bound of the 
maximum number of formulas of a priority level - we 
may take for instance fmax = IKJ). Then it can be 
shown that the only consistent environments of K hav­
ing an a posteriori probability which does not tend to 
0 when € --+ 0 correspond exactly to the lexicograph­
ically preferred subbases (which generalizes Proposi­
tion 1 ) , and that 1/J is lexicographically deduced from 
K iff Belx('I/J) -t-o 1 (which generalizes Proposition 
5). 
6 Related work and conclusion 
We have strengthened the already known connections 
between syntax-based default reasoning, model-based 
diagnosis and ATMS, and belief functions, by building 
on deKleer's infinitesimal probabilities of fault. We 
have followed the following steps: 
(1) syntax-based nonmonotonic entailment is viewed 
as diagnosis ,  by considering each piece of information 
as the description of how a component works, and the 
source which provided us with it as the component; 
(2) we assume that all sources have very small {and 
equal) initial probabilities of fault, and that they are 
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independent; 
(3) we compute the probabilities of each candidate, 
and then a belief function on the language which can 
be interpreted as a probability of provability; 
( 4) we use this belief function to define syntax-based 
nonmonotonic consequence relations; 
(5) lastly, we position these definitions in the litera­
ture of syntax-based approaches to nonmonotonic en­
tailment. 
Our work integrates various subfields of AI and thus 
there are many rel;ated works, more so bacause the 
links between these subfliels had already received a lot 
of attention in the literature. Many authors assign 
prior probabilities to assumptions or components and 
compute then posterior probabilities of candidates, 
and some of them compute a belief function ([34] [27] 
(22], (35]) but generally the initial probabilities are as­
sumed to be given by the user. De Kleer [12) uses the 
same basic assumptions as us (2) but he computes then 
posterior probabilities of candidates conditioned by a 
measurement (in order to find the best measurement 
to do next), which diverges from our step (4). 
Furthermore, it is worth noticing that the "non­
trivial" (i.e. other than 0 and 1) belief weights we 
obtain when £ --> 0 are obtained from a completely 
syntactic knowledge base without explicit numbers. A 
related work which shares this feature is the Dempster­
Shafer handling of default rules of Benferhat and 
Smets [3]: they start from a set of ranked default rules, 
where the ranking comes either from the user or from 
the ranking procedure of Goldszmidt and Pearl's Sys­
tem Z [28]; they associate then to each default of rank 
i the mass 1-Ei (with Ei � 1 and Ei+! � ci) and com­
pute then a belief function assuming independence be­
tween the defaults. Note that cf and cJ', as well as ar­
bitrary products of£; 's, are not comparable. The com­
puted belief function is used to define an inference re­
lation (in the same way as f---I) which solves the prop­
erty inheritance blocking problem. The common point 
to their work and ours is the generation of a belief 
function from a knowledge base (in their approach, a 
ranked set of default rules); but the objective pursued 
is different: while they search for a consequence rela­
tion solving the blocking inheritance problem, we want 
to characterize consequence relations in terms of prob­
abilities of fault of the sources. Other authors have 
used infinitesimal probabilities in nonmonotonic rea­
soning, following Adams' £-semantics (especially Pearl 
[27], Goldszmidt et al. [18)); in these approaches the 
default rule a _. f3 is translated by Pr(f31a) � 1 - e: 
with £ � 1. The main difference with our use of in­
finitesimal probabilities relies in their interpretation 
(in the latter approaches they are conditional probabil­
ities qualifying default rules while in ours they qualify 
the relevance of a piece of information). 
Obviously, steps (3) and (4) can be done without as­
suming infinitely small prior probabilities. Thus, the 
definitions given in Section 4 still make sense in the 
case we start with non-infinitesimal user-given proba­
bilities of failure; but the results do not hold any longer 
and the characterization of these inference relations is 
thus much less interesting. 
We would like to emphasize that our contribution does 
not really propose a new formalism nor a new way 
to perform nonmonotonic reasoning, but rather puts 
together the (already known) links between syntax­
based default reasoning on one side, and ATMS, di­
agnosis and belief functions on the other side, and as­
sumes further independence of the pieces of informa­
tion and infinitely small probabilities of failure. Now, 
although the theoretical complexity of syntax-based 
entailment relations has received recently some atten­
tion [25) [7], up to now, the more practical algorithmic 
and implementation issues have been less studied in 
the literature of syntax-based default reasoning than 
in the literature of ATMS and model-based diagnosis. 
Therefore, our conclusion (and our hope) is that that 
syntax-based default reasoning should benefit from ex­
isting works on the aforementioned fields, such as the 
characterization of tractable subclasses (e.g. [5]), ex­
perimental results etc. 
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